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Abstract: 
We report the results of a choice experiment based on a unique sample of 
325 active actors in the bushmeat trade in the Kilombero Valley, Tanzania. 
The experiment was designed to investigate what factors are most likely to 
induce a shift to an alternative occupation. Specifically we asked 
respondents to choose between hunting/trading bushmeat and alternative 
salary paying work, where the attributes of these alternatives varied and 
included measures of command and control, the price of substitute meat, 
the daily salary in the work option and donation of livestock. We model the 
choice contingent upon socioeconomic characteristics. The results show 
that the magnitude of fines and patrolling frequency has very low influence 
on the choice to engage in hunting/trading bushmeat relative to the salary 
in an alternative occupation. Donation of livestock and the price of 
substitute meats in the local market both affected the choice significantly, 
with opposite effects as expected. In addition wealthier households were 
more likely to choose to continue hunting/trading bushmeat. The results 
suggest that the bushmeat trade could be reduced to below 10% of the 
current level if a job paying USD 3.37 per day was available for the actors 
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We report the results of a choice experiment based on a unique sample of 325 active actors in the 
bushmeat trade in the Kilombero Valley, Tanzania. The experiment was designed to investigate 
what factors are most likely to induce a shift to an alternative occupation. Specifically we asked 
respondents to choose between hunting/trading bushmeat and alternative salary paying work, where 
the attributes of these alternatives varied and included measures of command and control, the price 
of substitute meat, the daily salary in the work option and donation of livestock. We model the 
choice contingent upon socioeconomic characteristics. The results show that the magnitude of fines 
and patrolling frequency has very low influence on the choice to engage in hunting/trading 
bushmeat relative to the salary in an alternative occupation. Donation of livestock and the price of 
substitute meats in the local market both affected the choice significantly, with opposite effects as 
expected. In addition wealthier households were more likely to choose to continue hunting/trading 
bushmeat. The results suggest that the bushmeat trade could be reduced to below 10% of the current 
level if a job paying USD 3.37 per day was available for the actors involved, all else equal.  
 
Keywords: Choice experiment, bushmeat, poaching, wildlife management  
  





Despite high levels of de jure protection wildlife populations in most parks in the tropics are 
negatively affected by hunting (Craigie et al. 2010; Laurence et al. 2012; Geldmann et al. 2013), 
and conservation efforts have hence been considered to fail in relation to protected area 
management and regulating trade in wildlife products (Bennett 2011; Harrison 2011). This has 
prompted calls for the use of market-based instruments and other economic incentives to promote 
more efficient environmental regulation (Damiania & Hatch 2005). However, insufficient 
information is available on what determines illegal hunting effort (Wilkie et al. 2005) and on what 
factors more likely may induce actors to shift to an alternative occupation. Attempts to explicitly 
examine the sensitive choice to engage in hunting and trading bushmeat have rarely been made. But 
choice experiments, a stated preference method which has more than 20 years use in developing 
countries (Whittington 2010), may allow us to elicit comparable measures of preferences across 
factors and attributes of the choice to hunt/trade bushmeat relative to alternative options, while 
reducing the sensitivity of the issue by using hypothetical scenarios. While stated preference 
methods are vulnerable to hypothetical bias they are the only way to capture preferences ex ante of 
a change (Bateman et al. 2002). Careful attention to design reduces such bias yet it has to be 
considered in interpreting results.  
Moro et al. (2012) recently undertook an inspiring attempt to determine what would most efficiently 
reduce bushmeat hunting in Serengeti using choice experiments. Their focus was on the trade-off 
between hunting effort and other livelihood strategies and their sample consisted of regular 
community members asked to imagine and answer as if they were hunters. While the subject may 
be less sensitive to this sample it may not well represent groups actively involved in the bushmeat 
trade. Several valuation studies show that familiarity with goods change the stated value, improve 
preference estimation (List 2005; Christie et al. 2006), and decrease uncertainty associated with 




making the trade-offs (Olsen et al. 2011). The decision to undertake an illegal activity such as 
hunting and trading bushmeat is not just a question of expected income and economic rationality 
but also depends on subjective norms and the specific attitude towards the behavior (St John et al. 
2010). These aspects affect individuals utility and hence the likelihood of engaging in a given 
activity. Combined with the many studies revealing distinct socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of hunting households (Loibooki et al. 2002; Starkey 2004; Coad et al. 2010; 
Mifunda & Røskaft  2010), this suggests that preferences and trade-offs of non-hunters are likely to 
be different from those involved in hunting and trading bushmeat. Here we also focus on the choice 
between hunting/trading bushmeat and alternative occupations – but we use a sample of 325 
individuals currently active in the bushmeat trade in the Kilombero Valley of Tanzania. Hence this 
study as far as we know constitute the first choice experiment with actors involved in a bushmeat 
commodity chain. In addition to providing results on actual as opposed to potential hunters 
preferences and trade-offs (i.e. Moro et al. 2012), this enables us to differentiate between actors 
with distinctly different roles in the bushmeat trade and hence assess the necessity of differentiated 
policies and management strategies.  
Specifically we asked respondents to choose between a day of hunting/trading bushmeat and a day 
of salary based work, under varying conditions of law enforcement patrol frequency and 
magnitudes of fines for the former alternative; salary in the work option for the later alternative; and 
the price of substitute domestic animal meat and donation of a number of cows to the household 
common for both alternatives. We further model the choice contingent upon socioeconomic 
characteristics.  
 






The study was conducted in the Kilombero Valley which is one of Africa’s largest wetlands 
spanning more than 6,550 km
2
 and a component of the greater Selous-Niassa ecosystem centered on 
the world heritage listed Selous Game Reserve to the south (Fig. 1).
 
To the north the valley borders 
the Udzungwa Mountains, a component of the Eastern Afro Montane Biodiversity Hotspot, and to 
the east the Mikumi National Park. The standard of material well-being in the area is extremely low 
(Starkey et al. 2002). The study focuses on three anonymous villages located on the northern edge 
of the valley of which the central part is designated as the Kilombero Game Controlled Area 
(KGCA), below the Udzungwa Scarp Forest Reserve (USFR). The villages are known for 
unlicensed commercially oriented hunting and bushmeat trade resulting in marked declines of 
several species including the near endemic puku (Kubus vardoni) (TAWIRI 2009).   
 
Data Collection 
A focus group discussion in each village, conducted in June 2011, with 5-7 key informers involved 
in the bushmeat trade was used to assist our identification of factors likely to affect individuals’ 
choice between hunting/trading bush meat and alternative occupations. Participants were identified 
over the course of a one year study of the bushmeat trade in 2008 and 2009 (MRN unpublished 
data). The survey was undertaken October and November 2011 in Swahili with the aid of two 
research assistants. A snowball sampling strategy (Patton 1990), based on the local knowledge of 
collaborating actors, was applied to attempt to identify and interview all individuals in the three 
villages engaged in the bushmeat trade. The long term relations with the actors in the bushmeat 
trade in the area, and the local insight of research assistants, enabled us to obtain all identified 




actors’ confidence, ensure their collaboration and open discussion on the subject. A structured 
questionnaire was used to collect demographic and socio-economic household information incl. on 
income and selected productive and nonproductive assets owned (land, domestic animals and 
household assets) (see Appendix 1, Supporting Information). Income was converted to per Adult 
Equivalent Units (AEU) following Cavendish (2002). Detailed information on function in the 
bushmeat commodity chain was collected through an open-ended question. Respondents were 
placed in three main actor groups based on their own description of activities undertaken. Hence the 
sample consists of 80 hunters, 169 traders and 76 local retailers where: hunters undertake the killing 
and initial processing (chopping into lager parts); traders transport the meat to villages, make 
smaller packages of meat and sell to an established clientele of customers; or hire retailers who sell 
the meat in the streets (number of actors per villages is presented in Table S1, Supporting 
Information). After the initial questions, respondents were presented with the choice experiment.   
 
Choice experiment design 
Relevant attributes of the choice between hunting/trading bushmeat and alternative occupations 
were selected on the basis of what was considered important by participants of the focus group 
discussions, the first author’s experience from the area (cf. above) and informed by economic 
theory and the literature on drivers of the bushmeat trade (cf. below). The five selected attributes 
includes dairy cows donated (a commonly suggested and pursued extension strategy [e.g. Mockrin 
et al. 2005]), the price of domestic animal meat, daily salary in an unspecified but available 
alternative occupation of similar strenuousness, patrolling frequency by law enforcement staff and 
magnitude of the fine if caught (see Table 1). The underlying hypotheses are based on standard 
economic theory and empirical evidence indicating: 1) that people would be less likely to engage in 
hunting/trading bushmeat illegally if they had more domestic animals producing meat and dairy 




products for own subsistence use and income generation (Mockrin et al. 2005); 2) that a higher 
price of domestic animal meat will encourage hunting both to supply households own animal 
protein needs and to supply increased demand for cheaper bushmeat (Wilkie & Godoy 2001; Apaza 
et al. 2002; Brashares et al. 2004; Wilkie et al. 2005); 3) that higher wages increase the utility of 
choosing a salary job and hence reduce the propensity to choose the hunting/trading bushmeat 
option (Sirén et al. 2006; Gill et al. 2012; Sayer et al. 2012); and 4) that increased expected cost in 
terms of the product of frequencies of patrolling and fines reduce the inclination to choose the 
hunting or trading bushmeat option (Milner-Gulland & Clayton 2002; Damania et al. 2005).  
Combining all attribute levels would result in 768 alternatives. However, it is common practice to 
apply a fractional factorial design, selecting a subset of all possible combinations, yet maintaining 
estimation ability for main effects and some second order effects. The design software Ngene 
version 1.1.1. was used to generate such a design consisting of 12 scenarios (see example in 
Appendix 2, Supporting Information) optimized for d-efficiency. Scenarios were then grouped into 
three blocks each consisting of four choice sets. Each respondent was first randomly presented with 
one block. Subsequently they were presented with a random block of the two remaining blocks, 
where the scenarios in addition included the donation of four dairy cows (i.e. regardless of choice). 
The context of the experiment and the scenarios was furthermore described as a hypothetical game 
to reduce incentives for strategic answers (for further detail see Appendix 2, Supporting 
Information). Individual preferences were uncovered trough asking respondents to choose between 
the salary work option or continue hunting/trading bushmeat under these eight different 
circumstances.  
The choice experiment was followed by a direct open-ended contingent valuation [i.e. Willingness 
to Accept (WTA)] question, with a provision point mechanism, on the daily income respondents 




would require from an alternative occupation in order to drop hunting/trading bushmeat (for further 
detail see Appendix 2, Supporting Information).  
 
Analysis of choice experiment data 
As the choice experiment has only two outcomes (hunt/trade bushmeat or conduct salary work) we 
use a random effects logit model with a respondent identification number set as a group variable. 
The model include main effects of donated cows, price of domestic animal meat and salary, but an 
interaction term for the fine and patrol frequency attributes (henceforth referred to as the patrol-fine 
interaction). The two individual attributes must be dropped as the marginal effect of neither can be 
validly estimated without consideration of the other. We included a number of socioeconomic and 
demographic variables to examine the influence of wealth and other household characteristics. 
Hence the resulting model is a binary logit random effects model according to which the likelihood 
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s= 0 or 1 and v=1…325       (1) 
where v is the individual index and αv is a panel effect capturing the individual specific variance. 
The notation for the attributes and socioeconomic variables is described in Table 1. 
We tested for learning and fatigue effects across the choice experiment and for scale differences 
(scale is the inverse to the variance) between market actors and applied scale parameters where 
significant (for further detail see Appendix 3, Supporting Information). Marginal effects of one unit 
change, averaged over observations in other variables in the models was calculated using the 
EFFECTS command. Finally a model including interaction between actor groups and the various 




attributes and socioeconomic variables was estimated to test for significant differences between 
actor groups. The analysis was conducted in Nlogit 5/Limdep 10.  
 
Results  
The overall model is shown in Table 2. All attributes and socioeconomic variables were significant 
with the expected signs. In addition Mcfaddens pseudo R
2
 was relatively high at 0.56 suggesting 
that the co-variates significantly improve choice prediction. The model predicts accurately 81% of 
actual choices made. Data was adjusted for scale differences between the first and last four choice 
sets and between actor groups (see Appendix 3, Supporting Information).   
The results reveal that donation of cows, higher daily salary in an alternative available occupation, a 
higher patrol-fine interaction and cultivation of more land, significantly reduce the likelihood that 
the average person in the sample choose to hunt/trade bushmeat (Table 2). A higher price of 
domestic animal meat, having more value invested in selected assets per AEU (on the 0.1 level) and 
earning higher total annual household income per AEU was on the other hand associated with 
significantly higher likelihood of choosing to continue hunting/trading bushmeat. Marginal effects 
of one unit change, averaged over observations in other variables in the model reveal that an 
additional salary of 1,000 TZS per work day reduces the likelihood that the average person in the 
sample chooses to hunt/trade bushmeat by approximately 11% (Table 2). The effect of donation of 
four cows and an acre land cultivated per AEU reduces the likelihood by 9% and 4% respectively. 
A 10,000 unit increase in the patrol-fine interaction, however, had negligible but still significant 
negative marginal effect. A 1,000 TZS increases in the price of one kg domestic animal meat had 
very limited but still significant positive effect. On the other hand, for each additional million TZS 




household assets owned and each million TZS higher annual household income, the likelihood of 
choosing hunting/trading bushmeat increase by almost 28% and 12% respectively.  
However, the model incorporating interactions between actor groups and the attributes and 
socioeconomic variables indicates that there are significant differences between actors in some 
effects (Table 3). This includes a significant lower effect of cows donated that is almost cancelled (-
1.64 +1.22) for hunters while remaining negative for traders and retailers (the reference group). 
There is no significant difference between actors in the effect of price of domestic animal meat, 
salary or the fine-patrol interaction. However, the effect of land cultivated and total income is 
significantly more negative respectively positive for hunters and traders relative to retailers.  
Answers to the CV-format WTA question on how much income from an alternative source would 
be required for the respondent to drop hunting/trading bushmeat indicated an average daily salary of 
7,649 TZS/day (840 95% CI) for the combined sample, 10,016 (1,100 95% CI) for hunters, 7,022 
(771 95% CI) for traders and 6,553 (720 95% CI) for retailers with significant difference only 
between hunters and retailers (F=13; P<0.01). The assessed current daily salary rate for casual work 
in the area is around 3,000 TZS/day. The required amount may thus reflect a higher expected return 
from hunting/trading bushmeat. It may, however, also be somewhat inflated by strategic or 
hypothetical bias (cf. the discussion below). 
 
Discussion 
Effect of fines and patrol frequency 
The results reveal that traditional conservation approaches based on patrolling and fines have very 
low influence on the choice to hunt/trade bushmeat. This applied although the ranges were extended 




beyond the frequencies and fines currently used in the Kilombero Valley. Moro et al (2012) in their 
study find a much larger effect of enforcement in terms of the likelihood of apprehension, but this 
was based on a sample of the general population in the area. Therefore, in addition to the basic 
difference between the relevant attributes (see Appendix 2, Supporting Information) this may be 
explained by the currently very low patrol effort in KGCA and the fact that our sample consist of 
individuals actually involved in hunting/trading bushmeat who are likely to be fundamentally less 
averse to these specific risks than individuals not involved in these illegal activities (Milner-Gulland 
2001). Other studies have, however, found that hunting have declined as a result of increased law 
enforcement (Milner-Gulland & Clayton 2002; Jachmann 2008).  
Salary in an available alternative occupation 
Not surprising, the most important attribute affecting the choice is the daily salary in the alternative 
occupation, representing the opportunity costs of continuing hunting/trading bushmeat relative to 
taking salary work. Non-linear prediction (i.e. estimating the conditional mean) at the approximate 
current level of other attributes (price of 3,000 TSK/kg domestic animal meat; patrol frequency of 
once per month; fine of 50,000 TZS), indicate that the likelihood that the average individual will 
choose hunting could be reduced to 10% (arbitrarily selected level as a complete stop is probably 
unrealistic) if a job opportunity providing a salary of 5,400 TZS/day was available, all else equal, 
with likely positive effects on wildlife populations (cf. below). Recent evidence from Equatorial 
Guinea in support of this result found decline in the bushmeat trade following the outmigration of 
hunters to seek employment in the construction industry in a period of rapid economic growth (Gill 
et al. 2012).  
We chose to measure the salary attribute in terms of daily salary rather than monthly wage. This 
means that we cannot make direct inference as to whether respondents would make the same choice 
confronted with an opportunity for a longer term employment with a monthly salary. However, it is 




likely that greater job security would be associated with willingness to accept a lower salary per 
day. 
Donation of livestock and the price of domestic animal meat 
The second most important attribute of the choice was donation of livestock with the same direction 
of effect as observed by Moro et al. (2012). Non-linear predictions at the current level of other 
attributes (c.f. above) and assuming that no salary work is available indicate that the likelihood that 
the average individual would choose hunting could be reduced to less than 20% through donation of 
four cows. Just as any alternative economic activity that directly absorb labor and raise the 
opportunity cost, increased focus on livestock production may reduce the bushmeat trade directly by 
affecting individuals’ cost-benefit considerations. Specifically, livestock production may provide 
income through offspring, dairy products, and meat as well as contributing to substituting bushmeat 
as a source of meat for the household.  
An increase in availability of domestic animal meat at the aggregated level following a massive 
donation of livestock, could furthermore potentially reduce the price of domestic animal meat 
sufficiently to affect the relative demand for and price of bushmeat. But hard evidence that demand 
for bushmeat would lessen if livestock was more available is limited (Wilkie et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, while the marginal effect at an individual level is significant, implementation of such 
a policy at the aggregate level (particularly if scaled up to include other relevant villages) raises 
other concerns. Studies for instance indicate that competition and spread of diseases from livestock 
to wildlife already has adverse effects on wildlife populations in the Kilombero Valley (Bonnington 
et al. 2007). Thus donation of livestock does not easily suggest itself as a panacea for reducing 
bushmeat hunting, though it could be part of a combined policy.   




The price of domestic animal meat has very limited effect on the choice, and non-linear prediction 
reveals that the likelihood of choosing to hunt/trade bushmeat can be reduced only to 30% even if 
the price of domestic animal meat was reduced to a third of the current level when salary work is 
unavailable (i.e. adjusting the scenario described above). This may reflect the significant difference 
in price between domestic animal meat and bushmeat and respondents expectations of continued 
shortage of meat. Fresh bushmeat (all species combined) is sold in packages weighing about 2 kg 
(but varying depending on demand) and on average cost 2,609 TZS (33 95% CI) whereas cow meat 
on average cost 4,392 TZS (27 95% CI) per kg.  
Socioeconomic factors 
Respondents preferences, and hence choices, may vary systematically with socio-economic and 
demographic factors. We find that wealthier households, in terms of income (particularly hunters 
and traders) and value of assets are more likely to choose to continue hunting/trading bushmeat 
consistent with reluctance to relinquish what they know generates high profit (c.f. Appendix 4, 
Supporting Information), and because they perhaps are more productive at this than others, being 
less credit constrained, or subject to less risk in terms of enforcement implications. Our focus was 
exclusively on individuals involved in the bushmeat trade, but this result is consistent with recent 
studies indicating that within rural communities the middle or even higher income groups harvest 
most bushmeat (de Merode et al. 2004; Starkey 2004; Kümple et al. 2010). Similarly the negative 
effect of acres of agricultural land cultivated suggests that people (particularly hunters and traders) 
with more land more readily abort trading bushmeat perhaps in expectation of sufficient agricultural 
income and as a result of higher opportunity costs of labor on land. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Johannesen (2005) indicating that people cultivating less land in the Serengeti 
ecosystem are more likely to be involved in hunting.  




Hypothetical and strategic bias 
As all stated preference methods, this study is subject to hypothetical bias and particularly strategic 
bias. This could be further exacerbated by the developing country context including insecure 
institutions, low education and resulting lack of trust (Whittington 2010). In particular one could 
expect that attributes related to negative incentives such as patrolling frequency and fines could be 
underestimated compared to attributes representing positive incentives. We cannot exclude the 
occurrence of strategic answers. But inspecting the coefficient of the patrol-fine interaction it is 
evident that it is so low that even a severe downward strategic or hypothetical bias will not change 
the result that very high patrol frequencies or fines are needed to seriously affect the choice. 
Similarly, the estimated required salary to accept an alternative occupation (and the stated WTA 
income required to drop hunting/trading bushmeat), although higher than payments from available 
casual labor, is still within the same order of magnitude. Another common reason for hypothetical 
bias relates to unfamiliar contexts (List 2005; Christie et al. 2006). However, as we sample 
individuals currently involved in hunting/trading bushmeat and have selected attributes based on 
their relevance according to focus group discussions and interviews with similar individuals this 
aspect is unlikely to be a significant source of bias compared to e.g. Moro et al. (2012).  
Recommendations and future directions 
This paper supports the findings of Moro et al. (2012) in illustrating that choice experiments have a 
potential in providing specific and relevant information for policy development and selection of 
management strategies on the sensitive subject of the bushmeat trade. In spite of fairly modest 
sample sizes we are able to obtain significant estimates and make valid inferences on variables, and 
our models predict observed choices well. While the use of hypothetical scenarios likely have 
contributed to making the process of elicitation of preferences less sensitive, the previously 
established long term relations with these actors in the bushmeat market may also have contributed. 




Future studies applying this approach should identify, target and elicit preferences from people who 
are actually involved in the bushmeat trade, rather than approximating these by asking a broader 
sample of community members to respond as if they were hunters (as in Moro et al. 2012). As 
people self-select into these activities and those involved may be distinctly different from other 
community members, analyses should be based on the specific group in focus of the policy. This 
also enables stronger conclusions because information on preferences and trade-offs is based in the 
relevant socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and social psychological profiles (St. John 
et al. 2010). Most notably the likely higher risk aversion among a population consisting mainly of 
non-hunters (i.e. Moro et al. 2012) may explain the marked difference in the effect of command and 
control measures relative to this study. 
This study finds that realistic ranges of fines and patrolling frequencies have very low potential to 
influence the choice of hunting/trading bushmeat compared to the opportunity costs in terms of 
daily salary in an alternative available occupation, the potential in owning livestock, and the price 
of substitute meats. The models suggest that particularly the salary in an available alternative 
occupation would have the highest effect on the bushmeat trade. This is consistent with other recent 
studies indicating that hunting rarely is a preferred activity but rather viewed as a means of 
obtaining regular income when paid employment is unavailable (Coad et al. 2010; Kümple et al. 
2010), escalating during periods of economic recession and high unemployment (Endamana et al. 
2010; Wittemyer 2011). This suggests that perhaps anti-poaching policies should be directed more 
at increasing the opportunity cost of poaching by creating better alternative economic opportunities 
(Poudyal et al. 2009; Gill et al. 2012; Sayer et al. 2012). Specifically this study indicate that if a job 
was available paying the equivalent of USD 3.37 per day then hunting and trading of bushmeat 
could be reduced to 10% of the current level. That is, for less than 400,000 USD per year hunting, 
that appears to be the main reason for significant declines of buffalo, hippopotamus and warthog 




and substantial declines of puku and elephant populations (TAWIRI 2009, selected species), could 
in theory be almost eliminated in the three villages facilitating rebound of wildlife populations. At 
the same time, the redirection of work effort would produce compensating production values in the 
new occupations.  
However, caution is required in relation to implementing the management recommendations 
resulting from this study, as our assessments only reflect the choices of individuals at the margin. 
Large scale implementation of policies will have equilibrium effects not accounted for in studies 
such as this.  Specifically, even in the unlikely event that a major new employment opportunity 
could be established in the Kilombero Valley, achieving an effect on hunting would require that job 
opportunities were targeted at both current and potential new hunters and traders of bushmeat taking 
their place. It would also have to fully occupy their time budgets ensuring they will not pursue 
hunting activities in any spare time. Finally, the policy need to address the possibility that hunters 
may simply use this opportunity to purchase firearms themselves instead of renting them from JKT 
(Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa – national service) army personnel as appears to be common practice now. 
In addition bushmeat demand is likely to increase with increasing income (Wilkie et al. 2005; 
Godoy et al. 2010) as well as potential immigration (Poulsen et al. 2009) resulting from 
establishment of such new income generating opportunities in the Kilombero Valley. 
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Figure 1. Sketched map of Kilombero valley based on sheet SC-37-1 and SC-36-4 in scale 
1:250.000, Series Y 503, edition 1 TSD 1961, published by the survey division, ministry of lands, 
forests and wildlife, Tanganyika 1962.  
  












Table 1. Attributes, their levels and hypothesis about their effects on the choice to hunt/trade bushmeat or accept the salary job option. 
Hypotheses were largely based on bio-economic equilibrium theory as outlined in Milner-Gulland (2001) (see also Supporting Information, 
Appendix 1).  
  
Notation Attribute Levels Hypothesis 
Cd Cows donated 0 and 4 
Higher number of cows reduces the inclination to choose to 
hunt/trade bushmeat illegally because it supplies meat and 
products for own use and income generation 
Dp 
Price of domestic animal 
meat in general 
1.000, 3.000, 4.000 and 
6.000 (TZS/kg) 
Higher price provide incentives to hunt/trade bushmeat in 
order to cover own protein needs and profit from potential 
positive spill-over to the price of bushmeat  
S 
Daily salary in an 
alternative occupation of 
similar strenuousness and 
risk 
1.000, 2.000, 3.000, 
4.000, 5.000 and 7.000 
(TZS/day) 
Higher wages reduce the propensity to choose the 
hunting/trading bushmeat option. 
Interaction =       
PF 
Patrolling frequency by 
law enforcement staff 
Once per year, twice per 
year, once every month 
and once every week 
The product of patrolling frequency and magnitude of fine 
is the expected costs of enforcement. Therefore higher 
frequency and higher fines reduce the utility from 
hunting/trading bushmeat.  Magnitude of the fine 
30.000, 50.000, 100.000 
and 300.000 (TZS/arrest) 
Note: In addition the following continuous socio-economic variables were included, Av = value of selected household assets per AEU, Lc = 
acre land cultivated per AEU and I = total annual household income per AEU. 
 




Table 2. First column is the random effect binary logistical regression on the choice to hunt/trade 
bushmeat or do salary work (base group). Second column is the marginal effects for the logistic 
probability function averaged over observations. First numbers represent the regression coefficient 
and numbers in brackets are robust std errors. 
 
 Logit model Marginal effect 
Donated cows -0.94474 (0.16881)*** -0.09168 (0.01542)*** 
Price of domestic animal meat 
(1,000 TZS/kg) 
0.12150 (0.03401)*** 0.01179 (0.00316)*** 
Salary                              
(1,000 TZS/day) 
-1.15293 (0.03900)*** -0.11188 (0.00189)*** 
Patrol-fine interaction  
(10,000) 
-0.00045 (0.00018)** -0.00004 (0.00002)** 
Household assets value 
(1,000,000 TZS/AEU) 
2.83627 (1.45153)* 0.27524 (0.14008)* 
Land cultivated       
(acre/AEU) 
-0.39948 (0.16221)** -0.03877 (0.01571)** 
Total income            
(1,000,000 year/AEU) 
1.22790 (0.34971)*** 0.11916 (0.03354)*** 
Constant 3.58091 (0.28996)***  
Sigma 2.40894 (0.14065)***  
Model properties   
Observations 2593  
Groups (i.e. individuals) 325  
Log-likelihood -942.81755  
McFadden's pseudo R
2
 0.5590  
AIC/n 0.734  
*, ** and *** signify statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  




Table 3. Random effect binary logistical regression on the choice to hunt/trade bushmeat or do 
salary work (base group) incorporating interactions between actor groups and the attributes and 
socioeconomic variables. First number represents the regression coefficient and numbers in brackets 









Price of domestic animal meat (1,000 TZS /kg) 
0.14813 (0.05802)** 
Price of domestic animal meat*hunter 
-0.00793 (0.08515) 
Price of domestic animal meat*trader 
-0.01856 (0.07283) 






Patrol-fine interaction (10,000) 
-0.00093 (0.00038)** 
Patrol-fine interaction*hunter 
0.00051 (0. 00051) 
Patrol-fine interaction*trader 
0.00072 (0.00044) 
Household assets value (1,000,000 TZS/AEU) 
5.14175 (5.40045)** 
Household assets value*hunter 
-3.55845 (5.59533) 
Household assets value*trader 
0. 94900 (6.03015) 
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